The Highest Price Ever: The Great NYSE Seat Sale of 1928–1929 and Capacity Constraints by Davis, Lance E. et al.
705
The Highest Price Ever: The Great NYSE 
Seat Sale of 1928–1929 and Capacity 
Constraints
?
LANCE E. DAVIS, LARRY NEAL, AND EUGENE WHITE
During the 1920s the New York Stock Exchange’s position as the dominant 
American exchange was eroding. Costs to customers, measured as bid-ask 
spreads, spiked when surging inflows of orders collided with the constraint cre-
ated by a fixed number of brokers. The NYSE’s management proposed and the 
membership approved a 25 percent increase in the number of seats by issuing a 
quarter-seat dividend to all members. An event study reveals that the aggregate 
value of the NYSE rose in anticipation of improved competitiveness. These ex-
pectations were justified as bid-ask spreads became less sensitive to peak vol-
ume days. 
n February 1929 the New York Stock Exchange decided to increase 
its membership, fixed at 1,100 since 1879, by 25 percent. This expan-
sion occurred when business was booming and the real price of a seat 
on the exchange was the highest it has ever been. In this exuberant era, 
the NYSE was under extraordinary pressure. Members found it increas-
ingly difficult to handle the rising flow of orders. At peak times, there 
was a scramble on the floor to find counterparties and process trades; 
and some observers claimed that bid-ask spreads widened. These prob-
lems contributed to the slow erosion of the NYSE’s share of the na-
tional equity market. Although the membership had rejected previous 
recommendations by the NYSE’s leadership to increase seats, this time 
they listened and voted to accept a quarter-seat dividend to expand ca-
pacity and shore up the exchange’s dominant position. 
 Drawing upon newspaper accounts and archival materials from the 
NYSE, we chronicle the NYSE’s internal struggle over how to meet the 
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soaring demand for its services. The management’s proposed solution 
of a quarter-seat dividend to each member convinced a majority of bro-
kers that it was the best way to expand the exchange’s capacity. These 
dividends were then traded to create whole new seats that raised the to-
tal membership from 1,100 to 1,375. We conduct event studies of the 
failed effort to expand the exchange in 1925 and the successful one in 
1928/29. When the news of a possible seat dividend reached the mem-
bership in late 1928, seat prices rose. We estimate that there was ap-
proximately a 20 percent abnormal return, implying that the increased 
number of seats was anticipated to make the exchange more competi-
tive, thereby augmenting its aggregate value (the number of seats times 
the price of a seat), rather than leaving it constant. 
 The effects of order surges on NYSE-listed stocks’ bid-ask spreads are 
examined using a panel of individual stocks drawn from high and low 
volume days both before and after the increase in the number of seats. In 
1928, when volume climbed and the exchange was at capacity, the bid-
ask spread became very sensitive to the total number of shares traded on 
the floor and the dispersion of orders at the posts across the floor. After 
the increase in the number of seats, these effects were muted and custom-
ers’ costs did not jump. The brokers thus correctly anticipated that the in-
creased attractiveness to customers of the exchange from the seat-
dividend would help to maintain the NYSE’s dominant position.  
 This increased capacity permitted the NYSE to absorb more easily 
orders on the high volume days that punctuated every year. However, 
these additional seats did not provide enough reserve capacity for the 
exchange to manage the volume on the truly rare days of a panic, such 
as occurred in October 1929. Panic driven surges in orders have persis-
tently swamped exchanges throughout the twentieth century, leading the 
ticker to run late, delaying the delivery, execution, and settlement of or-
ders, no matter the extent of technological innovations 
THE NYSE FACES THE COMPETITION
 The current struggle by national stock exchanges for world domina-
tion has its origins in the competition among American exchanges in the 
1920s, when technology and greater public participation forced changes 
in the markets. While the NYSE was the dominant exchange, its posi-
tion was slowly slipping away as volume and new issues moved to other 
venues. The dramatic expansion of the NYSE in 1928/29 was perhaps 
its most important structural change prior to its 2006 transformation into 
a publicly owned company and its merger with Archipelago. Both re-
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sponses to competition led to a rapid rise in the price of a seat on the 
exchange, reflecting the market’s favorable assessment.  
 Our investigation of this earlier structural transformation and its ef-
fect on the competitiveness of the exchange is facilitated by newly col-
lected data from the archives of the New York Stock exchange for all 
seat prices from 1879 to 1971. Three volumes of the New York Stock 
Exchange’s Committee on Admissions registered all transfers of mem-
bership. The recorded transfers cover the period from 28 November 
1879 to 8 January 1880, followed by a gap, and then from 27 December 
1883 to 28 June 1971. The exact dates of the transfers are not provided 
until January 1935. Until that time, all trades during a week were re-
ported as of the end of the week. The supply of seats has been relatively 
constant over time. Except for the 275-seat expansion in 1929, there 
was only an increase of 70 seats in 1879 and a reduction of nine in 
1953. Seats were traded in a market operated by the Secretary of the 
NYSE, who posted the current bid and ask prices.1
 Nominal seat prices from 1883 to 1971 are graphed in Figure 1.2 The 
irregular time scale reflects the varying number of trades from year to 
year and reveals the extraordinary run up in the price of seats and vol-
ume of trading that began in 1925. The collapse precedes the 1929 stock 
market crash, while the low prices afterwards reflect the distressed state 
of the capital markets and the effects of the New Deal regulatory re-
gime. The data reveal a striking feature that has been hitherto over-
looked: the nominal 1929 seat price of $625,000 was the highest real 
price ever attained. Just before the NYSE’s conversion into a publicly 
traded company in March 2006, a peak nominal price of $4 million was 
reached in December 2005. However, adjusting the 1929 seat price by 
the CPI, the GDP deflator, or the Dow Jones Industrial yields a real 
price in 2005 dollars of $7.1 million, $5.9 million, or $7 million.3 By 
this measure, the value of access to the floor of the Exchange was never 
higher than it was in 1929; the NYSE was arguably at its apogee in the 
late 1920s. 
1 There were private sales of seats to business associates and relatives that were recorded by 
the Secretary, often at prices well below the market prices. Of the 4,344 transactions between 
1883 and 1940, 775, or just under 18 percent, were private sales. These trades were roughly 
evenly dispersed over time. We excluded these trades from our study, as they represented 
transfers of property to family members or partners and not market conditions. 
2 Every new broker, taking advantage of the increased number of seats, bought a quarter seat 
from each of four sellers. The price paid by a new broker is equal to the prices of the four 
quarter seats, which were recorded when he exchanged these rights for a whole seat. The prices 
for private sales were excluded as these were usually far below market prices. 
3 Although in late 1968 and early 1969 seat prices hit $525,000, their real value was 
considerably below the 1929 peak. A seat priced at $625,000 in 1929 had a real value of $1.3 
million measured by either the CPI or the GDP deflator in 1969. 
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FIGURE 1
PRICE OF SEATS ON THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 1883–1971 
Source: NYSE, Committee on Admissions.
Seats on an exchange are capital assets whose prices reflect stock-
brokers’ expected future profits from the special access offered to 
them by a seat on the exchange. Until the NYSE became a publicly 
owned company in 2006, the ownership of the exchange was vested 
with its members. The member-owners determined the number of 
seats; and before the advent of the New Deal legislation governing the 
securities exchanges, they set the rules of the exchange. The value of 
their seats, which they zealously guarded, was affected by the volume 
of activity on the exchange and the degree of competition among trad-
ers on the exchange and between the exchange and the rest of the mar-
ket. 
 By the mid-1920s there were many reasons for brokers on the NYSE 
to be pleased. More firms were listing on the exchange and turnover 
was rising. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle and the Wall
Street Journal gleefully reported new trading records.4 Yearly sales of 
shares in 1925 topped the 1919 record and monthly sales the 1901 record. 
Annual NYSE volume rose from 1.6 and 1.5 billion shares in 1925 and 
1926 to 1.9 billion in 1927, and then soared to 3.2 and 3.9 billion shares 
4 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 31 October 1925; and the Wall Street Journal, 29
October 1925. 
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FIGURE 2
MONTHLY NYSE STOCK SALES, 1920–1930 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Banking and Monetary Statistics,
table 135.
in 1928 and 1929.5 The growing flood of monthly orders is shown in 
Figure 2. There were more 1 and 2 million share days and consecutive 
million plus share days than in the previous boom years of 1901 and 
1919. The first 4 million share day was reached in 1928; it was followed 
quickly by a 5 and then a 6 million share day.6
 Behind this rising flow of orders was an increase in the social and 
geographic span of the market.7 The rise of the small investor brought 
5 NYSE, Yearbook, 1930. 
6 NYSE Statistics Archive, http://www.nyse.com. 
7 Another factor contributing to the rising demand for the services of the NYSE was the 
demise of the Consolidated Exchange. Founded in 1885, the Consolidated traded its own list of 
securities and many NYSE-listed securities, commodities, and petroleum futures. Unlike the 
restrictive NYSE, membership was available for “a few hundred dollars, with no questions 
asked.” The Consolidated grew rapidly after the panic of 1907. Trading reached a peak in 1922, 
after which the Consolidated was wounded by a series of brokerage failures that implicated its 
president, William S. Silkworth. The scandal was fatal to the Consolidated, which quickly lost 
business to the NYSE. Its closure was announced in 1926, but it did not finally wind down its 
operations until two years later. See Sobel, History.
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about an increase in odd-lot dealings, and the extension of the stock 
ticker west of the Rocky Mountains encouraged more trading by provid-
ing a timely dissemination of prices. The forthcoming extension of 
stock ticker services to the Pacific Coast and Florida was anticipated to 
increase business. To process greater flows, the NYSE announced on 13 
April 1928 the introduction of a new and speedier stock ticker—a ticker 
capable of running at twice the speed of the current machines. Then in 
1929, a newer model was promised that would operate three times as 
fast as the old one. In addition, a new central quotation system for re-
porting the bid and asked quotations was inaugurated at six trading 
posts on 1 October 1928. By 11 February 1929 it provided service to all 
posts. To ease physical constraints, the New Bond Room was opened on 
14 May 1928, adding 6,000 more square feet to the trading floor. 
Searching for more space, the exchange purchased the Commercial Ca-
ble and Blair Buildings on 21 December 1928.8 New enclosed trading 
posts replaced the old style round posts in 1929 to speed up the man-
agement of paperwork and enable the clerks to better assist the harried 
specialists. 
 Although more trading boosted brokers’ profits, it placed new strains 
on the operation of the exchange and the ability of brokers to deliver 
their services to their customers in a timely fashion. When volume was 
high, the clerical work of entering hundreds of orders in their proper se-
quence could not keep up.9 The rising volume of activity strained the 
exchange, and a new late closing record of 42.5 minutes in 1925 beat 
the old one of 25 minutes set in 1915. The President of the Stock Clear-
ing Corporation, Samuel F. Streit reported that records were reached in 
the number and value of stocks cleared: 
Settlements of these transactions have congested the machinery of the Stock Ex-
change and all hands have been called upon to work overtime in clearing the 
slates each day. All brokers and member firms have been called upon to make 
their deliveries as early as possible, for the purpose of speeding up the machin-
ery, and banking institutions also have been requested to assist the Stock Clear-
ing Corporation in every possible way.10
By the mid-twenties, the increased volume of orders regularly delayed 
settlement, forcing late hours and even a closing of the exchange on 
Saturday. There was also discussion of permitting the delivery of stock 
two days after the execution of orders instead of on the succeeding day. 
These remedies represented efforts to smooth the order flow as peak 
8 NYSE, Yearbook, 1928–1929. 
9 New York Herald, 26 January 1929. 
10 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 31 October 1925. 
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demand with a fixed clerical staff created temporary problems. The so-
lution was to increase the staff or use more automation. 
 While these problems affected the timely delivery of cash and certifi-
cates, the rising trend and peak volume days also increased the cost of 
transactions as individual brokers found it harder to find counterparties 
for their orders on the floor. With a fixed number of brokers, the mar-
ket’s capacity was not easily altered. When volume continued to climb 
in the second half of the 1920s, problems became more severe, and 
there were public complaints about the declining performance of the ex-
change. The NYSE conceded that there were difficulties because of 
“poor executions and the limited capacity of our market.”11 Members of 
the exchange began to fear that unless changes were made business 
would be lost to the Curb market and the out-of-town exchanges.12
 At a time when turnover was rising, the increase in new issues placed 
even more stress on the machinery of the NYSE. Yet, most new issues 
appeared on other exchanges. The exchange’s relatively tough listing 
standards limited new listings by the “high tech” firms of the day, 
which were more likely to appear on the New York Curb market and 
the regional exchanges. Although data on other exchanges are scarce for 
this period, Table 1 reveals the dimensions of the challenge faced by the 
NYSE. Between 1927 and 1929, the NYSE’s listings rose by over 12 
percent, and annual turnover jumped from about 1.0 to 1.5. Neverthe-
less, its competitors grew faster. The New York Curb market was the 
NYSE’s largest rival but it also complemented the NYSE by taking list-
ings that were below the NYSE’s standards. Many more new issues 
were listed on the Curb, and its volume rose faster than the volume on 
the NYSE. Chicago was the largest regional exchange, but did not par-
ticipate in the boom until 1928. It had only 237 stocks listed on 1 Janu-
ary 1927 and 238 a year later. But Chicago reasserted itself; by 1 Janu-
ary 1929, it had 426 issues. Annual turnover, which had been a mere 
0.14 in 1927, rose to 0.62 in 1929. 
 New exchanges also opened to accommodate the growing demand 
for new issues. On 4 June 1928 the Los Angeles exchange created its 
own Curb to expand capacity to handle new stocks and securities that 
did not meet the exchange’s requirements. The parent exchange saw its 
total volume increase from 27.1 million in 1927 to 49.4 million in 1928. 
Total volume for both Los Angeles exchanges reached 67.8 million in 
1928, or 7.3 percent of the NYSE’s volume.13 Aggressively pursuing 
new business, the Los Angeles exchanges played a central role in the 
11 NYSE, “Memorandum on Increasing Stock Exchange Memberships,” n.d. 
12 New York Times, 5 November 1925. 
13 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 16 March 1929.  
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TABLE 1
U.S. EXCHANGE LISTINGS AND VOLUME, 1925–1929 
   1925 1926 1927 1928  1929 
NYSE       
 Listed stocks  927 1,043 1,081 1,097 1,177 
 Number of shares (millions)  433 492 585 654 757 
 Market value (millions)  27,072 34,489 38,376 49,736 67,472 
 Annual volume (millions)  452 449 576 921 1,124 
 Annual turnover  1.04 0.91 0.98 1.41 1.48 
New York Curb       
 Annual volume (millions)  88 116 125 236 474 
 Volume as percent of NYSE  19.5 25.8 21.7 25.6 42.2 
Chicago       
 Listed stocks    237 238 426 
 Number of shares (millions)    77.2 91.5 132 
 Market value (millions)    5,200 6,069 9,328 
 Annual volume (millions)  14.1 10.2 10.7 38.9 82.2 
 Volume as percent of NYSE  3.1 2.3 1.9 4.2 7.3 
 Annual turnover    0.14 0.43 0.62 
Sources: NYSE, Report of the President, 1929; New York Curb Exchange, New York Curb Ex-
change—History; and Chicago Exchange, Chicago Stock Exchange: Record of Progress.
opening of the San Diego Stock Exchange in March 1929; their mem-
bers took half of the 40 San Diego seats.14 These exchanges not only 
handled new regional business but also poached trading from New 
York. Sampling the volume of shares traded as reported in the Bank and 
Quotation Record for the Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, De-
troit, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and San Francisco ex-
changes, Tom Arnold, Philip Hersch, J. Harold Mulerin, and Jeffry Net-
ter found that there was a significant overlap of trading on the U.S. 
stock exchanges.15 In January 1929, 8.6 percent of the trading volume 
on the NYSE occurred in securities traded on regional exchanges, while 
the Curb had 27.7 percent of its volume in such securities. However, 
trading in New York stocks was much more important for the regional 
exchanges, where regional stocks only accounted for 63.7 percent of 
their trading volume, with NYSE and Curb market-listed securities rep-
resenting the remainder. If the NYSE began to experience difficulties, 
the regional exchanges were only too happy to seize its business. 
 Although volume data for many exchanges are sketchy, the problems 
of the NYSE can be seen by comparing the aggregate values of Ameri-
can exchanges as measured by the prices of their seats. Given the for-
ward-looking nature of asset prices, the price of seats assesses the future 
prospects of the exchanges. The bull market of the late 1920s led to a 
14 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 23 March 1929. 
15 Arnold, Hersch, Mulerin, and Netter, “Merging Markets.” 
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FIGURE 3
THE RELATIVE SHARES OF THE AGGREGATE VALUE OF U.S. STOCK EXCHANGES, 
1927–1929
Source: Bond and Quotation Record, 1927–1929.
general rise in the value of American stock exchanges. The aggregate 
value of the U.S. exchanges soared from $220 million in January 1927 
to $372 million a year later, climbing to a peak of $912 million in Sep-
tember 1929 before collapsing. Although the NYSE increased in value 
from $192 to $687 million from January 1927 to September 1929, it 
steadily lost “market share” as seen in Figure 3. Averaging 89 percent 
of all exchanges’ value in 1927, the NYSE saw its share of aggregate 
value drop to an average of 76 percent in 1929. It is no surprise that 
many NYSE brokers were alarmed as they watched changing seat 
prices, which meant that the New York Curb Exchange increased its 
share from 7 to 13 percent and the regional exchanges from 5 to 10 per-
cent over the same period. 
 While individual NYSE brokers were enjoying higher profits from 
the boom in volume, the erosion of the NYSE’s market share repre-
sented a serious threat to their future earnings. The profitability of the 
NYSE derived from its dominant position. Order processing costs are a 
decreasing function of volume, and higher volumes will produce shorter 
holding periods and lower bid-ask spreads. If one market has greater 
volume, its cost advantage will attract more volume and lead to consoli-
dation in a single market. Liquidity thus attracts more liquidity, and this 
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positive trading externality should result in one trading venue.16 The 
NYSE had achieved the dominant position in its listed stocks by provid-
ing the lowest cost market, but the rapid growth in new issues in the late 
1920s created viable alternative venues. Any problems on the NYSE 
would raise the cost of trades executed on its floor and reduce its attrac-
tiveness vis-à-vis other exchanges, leading to the prospect that it could 
lose its cost advantage and dominant position.  
Early on, the NYSE responded to the rising inflow of orders by rais-
ing commissions. On 24 October 1924 the NYSE significantly raised 
its minimum commission per hundred shares.17 However, in this com-
petitive environment further increases in commissions would have 
driven more business to other exchanges. Thus, the NYSE did not 
consider a further increase in the minimum commission after 1924.18
Somehow it would have to expand capacity without undermining the 
value of existing seats. Technology could speed up the delivery of or-
ders or the dissemination of prices with a faster ticker, and a larger 
back office staff could process settlement more quickly, but the key 
constraint was on the floor of the exchange where the number of mem-
bers who could trade stocks was fixed. This constraint created prob-
lems that threatened to decrease liquidity, widen bid-ask spreads, and 
alienate customers.  
THE CAPACITY CONSTRAINT ON THE FLOOR OF THE NYSE
 How exactly did a higher inflow of orders, especially on peak volume 
days, reduce the liquidity of the NYSE and what effect did it have on 
bid-ask spreads? Brokers on the floor of the exchange were identified 
by their principal function: specialist, commission broker, odd-lot bro-
ker, two-dollar broker, and floor broker. An incoming order for the pur-
chase or sale of a specific stock arrived in the hands of a commission 
broker who took the order to the post on the floor assigned to that spe-
cific stock. At the post, a specialist (trading on his own account or as an 
agent for another broker) had an affirmative obligation to maintain a 
16 Madhavan, “Market Microstructure.” 
17 Beginning on 8 May 1919, the minimum commission was $15 per 100 shares for stocks 
priced from $10 to $124 7/8 and $20 for shares over $125. After 30 October 1924, the minimum 
for shares priced from $10 to $99 7/8 was $12.50 plus 0.1 percent of the amount traded rounded 
down to the nearest $2.50. Thus, if a share cost $80 (the average price of a stock on the NYSE 
in 1928–1929 was approximately $80), the price of a 100 share trade would be $20. Trades of 
shares ranging from $100 to $199 7/8 cost $25. See Jones, “Century.” 
18 In 1928 several odd-lot houses raised their minimum commissions. “Because of pressure 
on small-lot business, 75 of the larger firms yesterday advanced their minimum commissions to 
$5 for each transaction.” See Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 16 February 1928. These 
firms accounted for only a modest share of the securities markets. 
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continuous market and to post bid and ask prices for the stock. The 
commission broker could trade with the specialist at the posted spread 
or with any other broker at or within the spread. The greater the number 
of counterparties faced by the commission broker, the increased compe-
tition and hence liquidity would press down the bid-ask spread. 
 Other brokers played important roles at the post. If an order were for 
less than 100 shares, the commission broker would transact with an 
odd-lot broker who acted as an intermediary on his own account to ac-
cumulate and trade shares in round lots.19 If there were more incoming 
orders than the commission broker could handle, he might have some 
orders taken to the appropriate posts by two-dollar brokers for a fee. 
When volume surged, the two-dollar brokers’ assistance to harried 
commission brokers was important to ensure the delivery of orders to 
the posts across the floor. Floor traders traded for their own account and 
helped to maintain a continuous market at the posts, ensuring that “mo-
mentary inequalities in the market arising from the mechanical methods 
of executing the round-share orders of commission houses and odd-lot 
dealers are instantly smoothed out and eliminated.”20 Contemporaries 
regarded floor traders as a vital group of potential counterparties who 
could move across the floor and provide liquidity as profit opportunities 
emerged. 
 The geography of the floor influenced the liquidity of the market. 
With a fixed number of brokers, if trading were concentrated in a few 
stocks at a few posts, there would be a large number of potential coun-
terparties for incoming orders, squeezing the bid-ask spread. But if trad-
ing were more diffused, spread out among the posts on the floor, then 
even with the same volume, the market could be much thinner as poten-
tial counterparties would be spread out. Bid-ask spreads would widen as 
brokers would have to scramble from post to post to execute their orders 
and costs to customers would rise. 
 Not all 1,100 brokers were on the floor at a given time and, in fact, 
the maximum number of active brokers was estimated at somewhere be-
tween 900 and 1,000. Unfortunately, there is no record of how seats 
were distributed among the different types of brokers who, with the ex-
ception of the specialists, decided how to make use of the seat. The 
number of seats occupied by specialists (approximately 150) changed 
slowly.21 Commission brokers were the largest group and their numbers 
increased as commission houses in New York and outside of the city 
19 In 1922 Meeker claimed that the odd-lot brokers accounted for 25 percent of volume and 
that their share declined substantially in boom markets. Meeker, Work.
20 Meeker, Work, p. 101. 
21 Meeker, Work.
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opened more branches to handle the inflow of orders during the 1920s. 
One problem for the exchange was that purchases of seats by the out-of-
town firms reduced the number of active members on the floor of the 
exchange. In addition, there were “inactive” seats held by prominent fi-
nanciers, including John D. Rockefeller, J. Pierpont Morgan, Frank Jay 
Gould, Percy A. Rockefeller, and Mortimer Schiff, who occasionally 
appeared on the floor to trade on their own account. 
 Contemporary observers believed that the ability of the exchange to 
ensure a continuous market was compromised, in part, by the shrinkage 
in the number of floor traders. Meeker blamed this loss on the New York 
State stock transfer stamp tax of 1905 and the federal stamp tax, intro-
duced during World War I, both of which fell disproportionately on the 
floor traders.22 The combined state and federal taxes imposed a $2.00 tax 
on every sale of 100 shares of stock of $100 par value.23 For a trade that 
earned 1/8, or $12.50, on 100 shares at $100, a floor trader would only 
earn $7.50 after paying $1.00 to a commission house to clear the trade 
and $4.00 in taxes. At the beginning of the twenties, Meeker contended 
that the number of floor traders had fallen from 200 to 50, commenting 
that “the whole of the market has to a considerable extent been rendered 
less stable than formerly,” with presumably the number of commission 
brokers increasing.24 In 1928 the NYSE president made a similar claim 
that the wartime federal transfer tax had caused the number of floor trad-
ers to fall from 200 to 30, and that this small number was a cause of the 
“wide span between bids and offers on the floor.”25
 How seriously did rising trend volume and peak surges affect the ef-
ficiency of the exchange? If there were real capacity constraints im-
posed by the fixed number of seats, it should have reduced liquidity and 
produced a rise in the bid-ask spreads. In this period, the New York 
Times reported daily closing bid-ask spreads for the NYSE stocks in 
addition to daily volume, high and low prices for the year, high and low 
prices for the day, opening and closing prices and the change in price 
from the previous day. Order-flow problems should have been most se-
vere on peak days, when there was an exceptionally high volume and 
the orders were diffused among a large number of listed stocks. To cap-
ture the effects of this problem, we collected daily data on all stocks 
from the New York Times for selected days before and after the quarter-
seat dividend. 
22 Meeker, Work.
23 Goldman, Handbook. 
24 Meeker, Work.
25 E. H. H. Simmons, Report of the President NYSE 1 May 1928 / 1 May 1929, p. 62; and 
“Memorandum on Increasing Stock Exchange Memberships,” undated, NYSE Archives. 
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 First, to select the days, every day from January to October 1928, 
when the seat increase was proposed, was sorted by volume. The five 
peak days (12 June, 16 May, 21 September, 7 September, and 27 
March) were selected to capture any congestion. To examine how the 
exchange handled peak volume after seats were added, every day from 
March 1929 to August 1929 was sorted by volume.26 The top two vol-
ume days, 26 March and 1 March, were selected. However, they may 
not provide a good indication of whether the seat increase eased conges-
tion because few additional seats were effectively added by March and 
volume on these two days was significantly higher at 8.2 million and 
6.0 million shares compared with the volume of 5.3 million shares on 
12 June 1928, the highest predividend volume day. The possibility re-
mains, therefore, that congestion could occur at these much higher vol-
umes even with an increased number of seats. To assess more accu-
rately the effect of seat expansion on congestion, three days were picked 
(9 August, 22 May, and 16 August 1929) that nearly matched the peak 
volume for the period January–October 1928. To provide a contrast 
with potentially congested days, the five lowest volume days’ data for 
March–August 1929 (20 April, 15 June, 8 June, 25 May, and 18 May) 
were collected. The low volumes for January–October 1928 were lower 
by more than one-half, so only the three lowest (20 April, 15 June, and 
9 June) were picked, and two low days (3 March and 19 July) that 
matched the period after seat expansion were chosen.  
 The key statistics for all 20 days are presented in Table 2. Relative to 
low volume days, high volume days, measured either by total daily vol-
ume or daily turnover, involved a larger number of stocks, although on 
a given day several hundred listed stocks were not traded. Higher vol-
ume for a particular stock should have lowered the spread; but there is 
no obvious evidence for this effect in the median or modal spread, 
where one-eighth was the minimum tick. Nor do volumes five times 
higher seem to lower the mean spread (weighted by sales) or the 
weighted mean spread as a percentage of the closing price. However, 
the spreads do seem to be influenced by the distribution of trading. The 
more concentrated trading was—as measured by the share of sales in 
the most active stock, the most active 20 stocks, or a Herfindahl index 
of sales—the lower the spreads. The concentration of brokers at fewer 
posts, which increased the number of potential counterparties at one lo-
cation, appears to have reduced bid-ask spreads no matter whether it 
was a low or high total volume day. 
26 The months of November 1928 to February 1929 were omitted because they followed the 
dividend announcement and preceded the increase in seats. The choice of days for the sample 
ends in August to eliminate the effects of the crash of 1929. 
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 To determine whether peak order flows reduced the liquidity of the 
NYSE by widening specialists’ bid-ask spreads, we employed a stan-
dard model of the bid-ask spread.27 We estimated the bid-ask spread for 
the ith stock on date t, measured as the log of the closing bid-ask spread 
divided by the closing price or lnspreadit
lnspreadit = b0 + b1lnsalesit + b2lnpriceit + b3lnyearvltyit + (1) 
b4lndayvltyit + b5lncallrateit + b6lntotalvolumet + 
b7lnherfindahlt + b8highvolume*lnsalesit + 
b9highvolume*lnpriceit + b10highvolume*lnyearvltyit + 
b11highvolume*lndayvltyit +
b12highvolume*lncallratet + 
b13hhighvolume*lntotalvolumet + 
b14highvolume*herfindahlt
Specialists have an obligation to accept orders from other brokers and 
maintain a portfolio of stocks. The bid and ask prices they post are af-
fected by the volume, the number of trades, capitalization, the price of a 
share, and price volatility.28 Although we do not have information on 
the number of trades or the capitalization of companies that are usually 
used as explanatory variables for liquidity in models of the bid-ask 
spread, we do have volume.29 The higher the daily volume, the greater 
the number of orders brought to a specialist’s post, the greater the li-
quidity, which should have lowered the bid-ask spread. To capture this 
effect, we included the variable lnsalesit, the log of the sales for stock i,
whose effect is expected to be negative. Although the spread should be 
proportional to the price of a security, the NYSE’s fixed commissions 
altered this proportionality. With costs high for low-priced stock, inves-
tors tended to trade in high-priced stock to lower their transactions costs 
and so created a negative relationship between price and spread. For this 
effect, we used the log of the closing price, lnpriceit, which we expect to 
have a negative sign on its coefficient. Increased volatility should have 
elevated bid-ask spreads, as it increased the risks for the specialist hold-
ing the portfolio of stocks. As the standard deviation of returns or  
market betas is not readily recoverable, we measure volatility by  
lnyearvltyit, the log of the difference between the yearly high and low 
27 For surveys of the literature see Madhavan, “Market Microstructure”; and Stoll, “Friction.” 
28 See Stoll, “Supply”; Menyak and Paudyal, “Determinants”; and Stoll, “Friction.” It is also 
argued that the spread serves as compensation for asymmetric information costs for the losses 
that specialists would have incurred from trades with well-informed traders that are recouped 
from less-informed traders, which the dealer could not have distinguished. See Easley and 
O’Hara, “Price”; and Demsetz, “Cost.”  
29 Laux, “Trade Sizes.” 
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price of the stock divided by the closing price, and by lndayvltyit, the 
log of the difference between the daily high and low price of the stock 
divided by the closing price. We anticipate that these variables will have 
positive coefficients. Interest rates may also have influenced the will-
ingness to hold inventories of stock and hence the bid-ask spread. This 
factor is represented by the log of the call rate on brokers’ loans or 
lncallratet, which we expect to have a positive coefficient.
30
 Activity on the whole of the exchange also influenced the bid-ask 
spread of an individual stock. If the total volume on the exchange rose 
with a given volume in an individual stock, it put upward pressure on 
the stock’s spread because of the fixed capacity. However, if trading 
became more concentrated in fewer stocks and thus focused on a few 
posts, liquidity was enhanced, as brokers were not spread out across the 
floor of the exchange. We proxy these volume and trading concentra-
tion effects by the log of total volume of the exchange, lntotalvolumet,
and the log of the Herfindahl index of all individual stock sales, lnher-
findahlt. We expect these variables to have positive and negative coeffi-
cients respectively. It is worth noting that the exchange-wide variables, 
the total volume and the Herfindahl index, are highly correlated  
(–0.728) because during the early days of the stock market boom in-
creases in volume were accompanied by trading in a greater number of 
stocks. Added to the regression to identify the differences between high 
and low volume days, and thereby highlight the capacity constraint on 
the machinery of the exchange, were six interaction terms, which indi-
cate how high volume days affected the coefficients on the individual 
explanatory variables. 
 For the combined ten high and low days in 1928, we estimated the 
model using fixed effects for individual stocks to capture some of the 
individual characteristics of stocks and the omitted variables, notably 
capitalization.31 Table 3 reports the coefficients and standard errors for 
two versions of equation 1; most of the coefficients are tightly esti-
mated. As expected, higher sales and a higher closing price lowered the 
bid-ask spread; and, as anticipated, more volatility drove the bid-ask 
spread up. However, even if a stock was traded, there was often no 
change in the price during the day. In these cases, the difference be-
tween the high and low is zero and the daily volatility cannot be calcu-
lated. Nevertheless, dropping those stocks from the regression is a use-
ful check because they were typically less active, smaller issues; 
30 The call loan rates were obtained from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Banking and Monetary Statistics. 
31 We also estimated the equation using OLS. The results were similar and can be found in 
Davis, Neal and White, “Highest Price.”  
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TABLE 3
ESTIMATES OF THE DETERMINANTS OF BID-ASK SPREADS, 1928 
* indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
+ indicates significance at the 5 percent level. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
fortunately, the estimates of the coefficients changed little for this 
smaller sample. As expected, a higher call loan rate induced brokers to 
lower their inventory and raised the spread. In general, higher total vol-
ume on the exchange drove up the bid-ask spread, but concentration of 
trading had no significant effect on spreads. However, it was on the 
high volume days, identified by the interaction terms, when congestion 
created problems and these variables assumed greater importance. The 
bid-ask spread responded differently to individual sales volume, volatil-
ity, and the call rate on the high volume days. What is striking is that to-
tal volume on the exchange becomes more important and concentrated 
Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects 
Sales  –0.113* –0.220*
(0.012) (0.018)
Closing Price –0.699*  –0.605*
(0.054) (0.068)
Yearly Volatility 0.187*  0.128*
(0.034) (0.045)
Daily Volatility 0.247*
(0.027)
Call Loan Rate 1.045*  1.057*
(0.297) (0.375)
Total Exchange Volume  0.200*  0.224*
(0.059) (0.073)
Herfindahl Index 0.028  0.025
(0.059) (0.073)
High Volume * Sales  0.042*  0.043*
(0.012) (0.018)
High Volume * Close  0.012  –0.006
(0.022) (0.030)
High Volume * Yearly Volatility  0.098*  0.051
(0.028) (0.042)
High Volume * Daily Volatility  0.031
(0.032)
High Volume * Call Rate  –1.555*  –1.322*
(0.303) (0.380)
High Volume * Herfindahl  –0.337*  –0.315*
(0.061) (0.073)
High Volume * Total Volume  0.229*  0.203*
(0.052) (0.064)
Constant  –1.667  –1.657 
(1.433) (1.828)
Adjusted R2  0.380  0.475 
Number of Observations  6,140 4,327
Number of Stocks 1,020 849
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TABLE 4
PREDICTED PERCENTAGE BID-ASK SPREAD 
 High Volume  Low Volume 
Daily 
Volatility
Excluded
 Daily 
Volatility 
Included
 Daily 
Volatility 
Excluded
 Daily 
Volatility 
Included
Mean total volume  0.777  0.764  0.847  0.649 
        
1 percent increase in total volume  0.804  0.791  0.848  0.649 
Total volume at 4 million  0.377  0.399     
Total volume at 5 million  0.801  0.847     
Total volume at 6 million  1.483  1.568     
        
Total volume at 1 million      0.864  0.661 
Total volume at 2 million      0.941  0.726 
Source: See the text. 
trading, which brought more brokers to fewer posts, matters now. The 
Herfindahl index has no significance except for high volume days, as 
indicated by the interaction term for high volume days and the index. 
These results confirm that a capacity constraint from the limited number 
of brokers tended to drive up bid-ask spreads.
 By how much would the bid-ask spread increase if volume jumped? Ta-
ble 4 provides estimates of the predicted percentage bid-ask spread, where 
all variables except total volume have their mean values for high and low 
volume days. The first row shows the predicted values when the total ex-
change volume was set equal to the sample means.32 The average price of a 
share in this period was $80; and at the mean volumes, spreads of 0.65 to 
0.85 percent implied costs of 52 to 68 cents. Spreads were quoted in ticks 
and the minimum tick was an eighth or $0.125; so for the spread to move 
one tick it had to change by more than 0.15 percent of $80 or $0.12. Con-
sequently, from both high and low volume day means, a 1 percent increase 
in volume would have yielded no perceptible effect on the bid-ask spread. 
An increase from one to two million in total volume increased the bid-ask 
spread by less than 0.10 percent or less than a tick, so costs would have in-
creased little if at all. On peak volume days, by contrast, higher total ex-
change volume quickly drove up spreads for individual stocks. The change 
from 5 million to 6 million raised the spread from 0.847 to 1.568 percent, 
suggesting a near doubling in cost. As contemporaries had warned, higher 
volumes yielded substantial jumps in the spread, enough to induce some 
investors to seek other venues for transactions. 
32 These predicted forecasts lie in the range of the bid-ask spread as measured by Jones for 
Dow-Jones stocks in the 1920s. Jones, “Century.” 
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 The responsiveness of the bid-ask spread reflected the general prob-
lems of the exchange in processing and executing orders. The number of 
brokers on the floor was a hard constraint that translated into higher costs 
when the floor was swamped with orders. The exchange’s leadership saw 
that higher spreads, slow processing, and rising fails would redirect order 
flow to other markets. At some point, the position of the NYSE as the 
most liquid market would begin to decline, undermining its cost advan-
tage and giving competitors the opportunity to become the lowest cost 
venues. The upward trend in volume and the increased frequency of high 
volume days also gradually impressed many of the exchange’s members 
with a heightened sense of urgency to expand the NYSE’s capacity. 
THE QUARTER SEAT DIVIDEND 
 The capacity of the exchange had been fixed nearly 50 years before. 
After the May 1869 merger of the NYSE, which had 533 members, with 
the 354 member Open Board of Brokers and the 173 member Govern-
ment Bond Department, the number of seats was set at 1,060. The only 
increase occurred in 1879 when the Governing Committee proposed the 
sale of 40 new memberships, increasing the total seats to 1,100, to fi-
nance the purchase of additional property adjacent to the exchange to 
ease its physical constraint. The seats were sold to the highest bidders 
with a minimum price of $10,000. Although 40 more seats would seem 
unlikely to have had much effect on seat prices, the vote by the member-
ship on the proposal was extremely close, 530 in favor and 510 against.33
 Apparently, 1,100 brokers provided sufficient liquidity for the ex-
change until the boom in the mid-1920s, as there is no recorded discus-
sion of the need to expand capacity on the floor of the exchange until 
then. On 28 October 1925 the Governing Committee of the NYSE took 
up the question of how to accommodate the increased demand for ser-
vices on the exchange. The chairman of the committee, Warren B. 
Nash, made the case for more seats, pointing to the rise in listings and 
volume. As membership had not increased since 1879, “a point might 
soon be reached when there would not be enough active members on 
the floor to handle adequately the constantly rising volume of orders.” 
Nash argued that capacity required not only “additional space and me-
chanical facilities but also more members to handle the market.”34 The 
committee then presented the members with a proposal to increase the 
number of seats from 1,100 to 1,125. Their plan called for the sale of 
33 The memberships were then sold at prices ranging from $13,500 to $15,000. W. B. Nash, 
“Remarks made before the Governing Committee Meeting,” 28 October 1925. 
34 W. B. Nash, “Remarks made before the Governing Committee Meeting,” 28 October 1925. 
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five seats each at $135,000, $137,500, $140,000, $142,500, and 
$145,000.35 Nash touted the change as yielding an equal benefit for all 
members, as the $3.6 million realized by the sale could be used to pay 
off part of the Exchange’s $6.5 million debt on its building, thereby re-
ducing annual dues for all members. 
 The optimism of the Governing Committee was not shared by many 
members, and there was a groundswell of opposition to this surprise pro-
posal. Opposition members felt that the Governing Committee had acted 
secretively and against their interests, and was engineering an increase in 
competition.36 Simmons attempted to placate the membership by meeting 
with them on 4 November. In the end, the Governing Committee failed to 
persuade the membership, and the resolution was rejected by a vote of 
648 to 268.37 Most observers pointed out that members expected to see 
their earnings drop if this proposal had been implemented.38
 After this ignominious defeat, the leadership abandoned plans to ex-
pand the exchange until the extraordinary stock market boom began to 
place additional pressure on the exchange. On 15 October 1928 Presi-
dent Simmons called a meeting of the Governing Committee to estab-
lish a Special Committee to consider again the question of whether the 
membership should be increased. To avoid a repeat of the 1925 failure, 
Simmons convoked a meeting of the members on 30 October 1928 be-
fore any recommendation was made. There he put forth the case for an 
increase in membership.39 He pointed out how the growth of the market 
affected every group of brokers on the exchange. For the commission 
house and two-dollar brokers, the extension of New York firms’ ticker 
wires, along with the establishment of branch offices and advertising by 
radio, had greatly augmented the inflow of business. Simmons observed 
that the odd-lot houses, whose business was also booming with the 
growth of the small investors, found it hard to obtain sufficient partners 
or representatives on the exchange. He told the members: 
all this increased business must be poured into our floor through an artificially 
restricted membership, which has obviously reached its capacity this year for 
handling the volume of business offered. There is no use in continuing our other 
efforts to extend and expand our business unless a comparable expansion occurs 
in our membership. 
35 NYSE Resolution, 28 October 1925; Simmons, “Letter to the Members of the NYSE,” 28 
October 1925 and, Report of the President, 1 May 1925 / 1 May 1926.  
36 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 31 October 1925; and New York Times, 5 November 
1925.
37 New York Times, 12 November 1925; and New York World, 3 February 1929. 
38 New York World, 3 February 1929; and New York Herald, 26 January 1929. 
39 Simmons, Report of the President, 1 May 1928 / 1 May 1929; NYSE archives, 
“Memorandum on Increasing Stock Exchange Memberships,” undated.  
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The inflow of orders placed specialists under enormous pressure to exe-
cute them and handle the paperwork. He bluntly told the members:  
There is no denying that in the great markets of this year, the Stock Exchange 
has been hampered in giving the public perfect brokerage service because of in-
sufficient attendance on the floor. As our markets grow larger and larger in vol-
ume, there is no reason for doubting that poor execution of public orders will 
continually grow worse. 
 Simmons believed that the NYSE stood to lose the good will of the 
American public. He argued that laborsaving devices had been fully ex-
ploited and “no new mechanical device can in the future make up for 
insufficient members on the floor to handle the business.” The inability 
to provide high quality service would throw business to the New York 
Curb Market and the out-of-town exchanges, which were beginning to 
list issues whose sole market had been in New York. Now that Europe 
had returned to the gold standard, he also saw the specter of competition 
from the London and Berlin markets. He noted that neither of those two 
exchanges limited their membership and even the Paris exchange was 
considering adding new brokers.40
 Faced with even higher future orders, Simmons proposed the issue of 
a seat “dividend” for each member that would double the number of 
seats to 2,200. To provide additional revenue for a future physical 
enlargement of the exchange, he recommended an increase in the trans-
fer fee on seats from $4,000 to $10,000. By increasing the number of 
seats and improving facilities, Simmons claimed that each exchange 
member would be able “to have his cake and eat it too.”
 While Simmons lobbied the membership, the Special Committee sent a 
poll to the members of the exchange. Members were queried about how 
quickly—within three months, within one year, or more than one year—
they would sell their rights if there were a 25, 50, or 100 percent increase 
in membership. In addition, the poll asked if members would try to buy 
up other rights and thereby be able to nominate a candidate if there were 
a 25 or 50 percent increase in membership.41 Based on 662 answers, the 
special committee concluded that that increasing the number of potential 
seats by 25 percent would be acceptable to the membership.  
 As in 1925 and even 1879, the brokers would have been concerned 
that more competition would reduce their current profits, but the value 
of their seats (reflecting the capitalized value of their future earnings) 
could also decline if the NYSE became less valuable. If business con-
tinued to slip away, other exchanges would have lower bid-ask spreads 
40 NYSE archives, “Memorandum on Increasing Stock Memberships,” undated. 
41 NYSE archives, Ballot, undated.  
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and might gain dominance in many securities. Even if there was more 
competition on the floor, brokers had to ensure that the exchange had 
the capacity to continue attracting the growing flow of orders. Thus, 
brokers might be willing to accept a 25 percent increase in the number 
of seats, as some increase in competition on the floor would be offset by 
maintaining the dominance of the exchange in an expanding market. 
 Following this sentiment, the Special Committee produced a report 
that recommended a 275 member increase to be achieved by the issue of 
a one-quarter seat right to each current member.42 Transfers would be-
gin on 18 February 1929 with all bids and offers in multiples of $500.43
In order to encourage the rapid creation of new seats, the committee 
proposed that members be required to dispose of their rights within 
three years. 
 Yet, increasing the number of seats was not the only possibility. The 
Special Committee had received other proposals for expanding the capac-
ity of the exchange. The most important of these proposals were to: allow 
partners or employees of members, especially clerks, to make contracts, 
substituting for members in some tasks on the floor; or permit leasing of 
seats by inactive members to increase the number of active traders on the 
floor. Both of these alternatives appear to have been rejected because 
they only found favor with out-of-town brokerages and the larger in-town 
brokerages that promoted them before the committee.44
 A leading opponent of the seat dividend proposal was Edward Allen 
Pierce. A former member of the stock exchange, Pierce was a partner in 
one of the largest brokerages, a firm with 18 partners, three of whom 
were members of the exchange. Pierce claimed that more seats would 
dilute their value and would not necessarily add brokers on the floor. 
Instead, he proposed that out-of-town members be allowed to lease their 
seats for a fee to individuals approved by the Admissions Committee. 
As an example, he suggested that an annual fee of $50,000 might be set, 
with $30,000 going to the lessor, $10,000 to the Exchange, and $10,000 
apportioned among the members to compensate for the increased com-
petition. This proposal received relatively little support as most mem-
bers of the exchange were neither members of large brokerages nor out-
of-town houses, and they owned but one seat. Allowing the leasing of 
seats would expand capacity and increase competition for them. The 
42 One member of the committee dissented, complaining that there was not enough physical 
space on the floor of the exchange to accommodate 275 new members, recommending only a 10 
percent dividend. Letter of Edgar Boody to the Governing Committee, 19 January 1929. 
43 Special Committee Letter to Members of the New York Stock Exchange, NYSE archives, 7 
February 1929. 
44 NYSE archives, C. Clothier Jones, Letter to Ashbel Green, Secretary of the NYSE, 17 
December 1928. 
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proposed compensation from leasing even 50 or 100 seats seemed small 
when spread among all the members. 
 Similarly, allowing clerks on the floor to assist with some activities 
or partners to substitute for the owners of the seat seemed to offer 
greater benefits to the larger brokerages that might more easily hire ad-
ditional staff or get a partner as a substitute. With a clerk’s active assis-
tance on the floor, a broker would be able to handle more business than 
an individual broker. Both of these alternatives were rejected by the 
committee. Clerks’ roles on the floor were then narrowly defined, and 
the Governing Committee adopted a rule that precluded the possibility 
of clerks acting in any capacity as brokers on the floor.45 Leasing re-
mained off the table until 1978, when the ownership of seats was domi-
nated by large brokerages.46 The promise of the quarter-seat dividend 
was that it would expand capacity and allow the NYSE to maintain its 
position as the dominant market, while compensating all brokers for the 
increase in competition on the floor; and crucially it had the potential 
for increasing the value of a seat if it augmented the exchange’s com-
petitiveness with other markets. 
 On 24 January 1929 the Governing Committee convened and voted 31 
to 1 to adopt the recommendations of the Special Committee.47 A straw 
vote revealed that members favored the increase by a ratio of three to 
one.48 The New York Herald wrote that the membership was being asked 
to “vote themselves a ‘melon’ of $137,500,000” (on the assumption that 
each right would be worth $125,000).49 Unlike 1925, this time the leader-
ship swayed the members; and on 7 February 1929, by a vote of 782 to 
133, the members overwhelmingly approved the expansion.50
DID THE DIVIDEND INCREASE THE VALUE OF THE NYSE? 
 The decision to augment the number of seats by 25 percent was an 
admission that the structure of the exchange needed to be revamped. 
45 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 15 December 1928. 
46 The Special Committee also complained that leasing and permitting clerks on the floor 
would undermine the “individual moral and financial responsibility” of traders on the floor 
because they might have little or no capital in the case of losses. Advocates responded that 
many seats were held by individuals who had little or no capital, and whose purchase money has 
been provided by their firms. Thus, responsibility rested with the firm, not with the individuals. 
See NYSE archives, E. A. Pierce, Letter to E. H. H. Simmons, 30 January 1929; and New York 
World, 3 February 1929. 
47 NYSE Governing Committee Minutes, 21 January 1929, pp. 619–20; and 24 January 1929, 
p. 631. 
48 New York World, 3 February 1929. 
49 New York Herald, 26 January 1929. 
50 NYSE Governing Committee Minutes, February 13, 1929.  
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The announcement of this increase was accompanied by a substantial 
contemporaneous gain in the value of a seat and of the exchange. Be-
fore any discussion of a seat dividend, the price of an individual seat in 
October 1928 was $450,000, implying that the aggregate pre-
announcement value of the exchange would have been $495 million. 
The postannouncement prices, which fluctuated between $560,000 and 
$625,000, yield aggregate values for the exchange of $616 to $688 mil-
lion. For the postdividend distribution prices, which ranged between 
$420,000 and $500,000, the exchange was valued between $578 and 
$688 million. 
 However, the great bull market was in full swing, and prices of seats 
may also have been climbing because of ordinary fundamentals. To 
separate the rise in prices due to anticipated gains in the competitive-
ness of the exchange from that of basic fundamentals, an event study is 
useful.51 Members of the exchange held strong views about any change 
in the structure of the exchange. Holding the other factors constant, the 
announcement of a change in the number of seats should have had an 
immediate effect on their prices. To examine the effects of announce-
ments proposing changes in number of seats on the value of the NYSE, 
we employ a CAPM model to estimate NYSE seat returns and the ab-
normal returns induced by the announcements.52 We conduct two event 
studies; the first event is the announcement of the failed proposal to add 
seats in 1925, and the second is the announcement of the successful in-
crease in 1929. 
 Owing to the fact that seat sales for the whole week were only re-
corded on the last day of the week, we restrict our analysis to weekly 
changes in the prices of seats, taking the last observed sale as the end of 
week price. The fundamentals that govern commissions and profits for 
brokers, and hence, seat prices on the exchange are the level of stock 
prices and the volume of shares traded. In the simplest model where mi-
crostructure, technology, and regulation are held constant, profits to 
brokers should be a function of the stock prices on the NYSE and the 
volume of shares traded. Assuming that the discount rate and commis-
sion rate are constant, seat prices will change only if there has been a 
51 Campbell, Lo, and Mackinlay, Econometrics.
52 Seat prices provide insight into the efficiency of the exchange under different technology, 
rules, and regulations. Schwert, “Stock Exchange Seats,” examined the efficiency of the market 
for seats, using end-of-month seat prices for 1926–1972. In similar studies, Jarrell, “Change”; 
and Golbe, “Negotiated Commissions” and “Has Deregulation,” used end-of-month postwar 
data to examine the effects of deregulation on the exchanges. More recently, Keim and 
Madhavan, “Information,” employed all bids, offers, and sale prices of NYSE seats for 1973–
1994 to study the determinants of pricing and the ability of seat prices to predict future activity 
on the exchange; and Keim and Madhavan, “Relation,” used additional annual data to look at 
the predictive power of seat prices for future stock market returns.  
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change in volume or share prices. The two measures of fundamentals we 
use are the innovations in the Dow Jones Industrials average and in the 
volume of shares traded on the NYSE. We employ both the change in the 
daily volume from week to week and the change in the volume over the 
last thirty days. Seat price returns and innovations in the explanatory 
variables were all stationary. Using Dickey-Fuller tests we easily rejected 
the hypothesis that there were unit roots in the time series. 
 We estimated the following CAPM regression53
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where Rt is the return on a seat on the New York Stock exchange over 
time t, rf, t is the risk free rate, measured by the three- to six-month rate 
on U.S. Treasury notes and certificates.54 The market return, rm, is the 
return on the Dow Jones Industrials. The variables for the changes in 
daily volume, DailyVolt, and monthly volume 30DayVolt, use volume 
data for the NYSE.55
 To conduct our event studies, we need to define the time of the 
event.56 Prices for seats would have moved once members became con-
vinced that a change in the number of seats would or would not occur. 
The movement of seat prices around the 1925 event window is depicted 
in Figure 4. The first public knowledge of a proposal to increase seats 
was 28 October 1925 when the Governing Committee issued a resolu-
tion to create and sell 25 new seats. This date marks the beginning of 
the event window, although some discussion of the proposal might have 
leaked out beforehand. The proposal was rejected by the membership 
on 11 November 1925, closing the window. This failure seems to have 
occasioned a rise in seat prices from $130,000 to $150,000; the uncer-
tainty about the rise in the number of seats feared by brokers may have 
depressed prices until the outcome of the vote was known.  
 The event window for the 1928–1929 quarter seat dividend is shown 
in Figure 5. Members’ expectations about the proposed increase in the 
number of seats probably evolved over time. There was no simple  
53 See Keim and Madhavan, “Relation.” 
54 The seat return is the weekly percentage change in the price of a seat. The data on interest 
rates were obtained from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Banking and 
Monetary Statistics.
55 New York Stock Exchange, Yearbooks.
56 Binder, “Event Study Methodology.” 
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FIGURE 4
NYSE SEAT PRICES, JUNE 1925–JANUARY 1926 
Source: Source: NYSE, Committee on Admissions. 
announcement that would have influenced prices; and given the failure 
in 1925, members might well have been skeptical about new efforts by 
the leaders of the exchange. The first indication that an increase in the 
number of seats was possible appeared on 15 October 1928 when Presi-
dent Simmons called a special meeting of the Governing Committee to 
discuss whether to increase membership. This body decided to convene 
a Special Committee. Seat prices were already rising before 15 October, 
although this increase may have been driven by other fundamentals. 
There might also have been some private conversations that leaked out 
in advance of this meeting, which could have raised seat prices. Conse-
quently, selecting this date as the beginning of the event window may 
underestimate the abnormal return. As he did not want to be accused of 
being secretive, as he had been in 1925, President Simmons pressed the 
case for increasing membership in a meeting with members on 30 Oc-
tober 1928. At this point, the potential increase in the number of seats 
could have ranged from 25 to 100 percent. Members were then polled 
on how fast new seats could be formed. The official proposal for the 
quarter-seat dividend came in a report by the Special Committee that 
was submitted to the Governing Committee on 21 January 1929. Three 
days later on 24 January, the Governing Committee reconvened and 
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FIGURE 5
NYSE SEAT PRICES, JUNE 1928–FEBRUARY 1929 
Source: NYSE, Committee on Admissions. 
voted to accept the report’s recommendations, a key moment marked on 
Figure 5. This action was followed by the members’ favorable vote on 7 
February 1929 that permitted transfers to begin on 18 February 1929. 
Thus, the second window covers the period from 15 October to 7 Feb-
ruary and encompasses a rise in the value of a seat from $425,000 to 
$600,000.
 The estimates of equation two for both events are presented in Table 
5.57 Although only one lag is used, the results are robust to other lag 
structures. One typical feature of asset return data is that the volatility of 
asset returns is serially correlated.58 To correct for possible autocorrela-
tion and heteroskedasticity, we have estimated the Newey-West stan-
dard errors and reported these in the table. The first regression estimates 
57 A more complete test of the announcement effects would include a test of the effects on the 
returns to seats on regional exchanges to determine if there were negative excess returns from 
the expansion of the NYSE. Unfortunately, such tests are not feasible, as data for these 
exchanges is only monthly and they were thin markets with fewer seats and fewer trades. The 
Curb Exchange in New York was bigger than the regionals, but even it had a relatively thin 
market in seats compared to the NYSE. Furthermore, the Curb had a long-term cooperative 
relationship with the NYSE. See White, “Anticipating the Stock Market Crash.” 
58 See, Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, Econometrics; and Poon and Granger, “Forecasting 
Volatility.” 
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TABLE 5
DETERMINANTS OF THE RETURNS TO NYSE SEATS
1920–1925 1920–1928
Intercept 0.001  0.005+ 
(0.003) (0.003)
rm,t – rf,t 0.189+  0.191* 
(0.104) (0.111)
rm,t–1 – rf,t–1 0.297+  0.357* 
(0.164) (0.136)
Monthly Vol t  0.009  0.005 
(0.009) (0.007)
Monthly Vol t–1  0.003  –0.004 
(0.008) (0.009)
Daily Vol t  –0.017  –0.054 
(0.028) (0.039)
Daily Vol t–1 0.009  –0.008 
(0.041) (0.027)
Number of Observations  211 320
Adj. R2 0.060  0.066 
* indicates significance at the 5 percent level. 
+ indicates significance at the 10 percent level. 
Note: The Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses.  
the model using data from 8 January 1920 to 15 October 1925, the end 
of the week for the last recorded sale before the opening of the first 
event window. The second regression covers the period from 8 January 
1920 until 11 October 1928. The estimates for the fundamentals leading 
up to the first and second events are very similar. A rise in the market 
returns and the innovations in the 30 day volume caused a positive 
change in the return to a NYSE seat. However, both measures of 
changes in volume have little effect. The fit of the equations is rela-
tively weak, although this is typical of most event studies of asset re-
turns.59
 The difference between the observed returns on NYSE seats and the 
fitted values gives the abnormal returns. Figures 6 and 7 plot the cumu-
lative abnormal returns, beginning several months before the event win-
dows for 1925 and 1929.60 In the case of the abortive 1925 attempt to 
increase the number of seats, there is no movement at the time of the 
announcement. But, there is a large sustained leap in the abnormal re-
turn immediately after the members voted to block the creation of the 
new seats, a move that reflected their view that this action preserved the 
value of their seats. 
59 See Keim and Madhavan, “Relation.” 
60 Typical of event studies, the cumulative abnormal returns exhibit considerable, apparently 
unexplained movement.  
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FIGURE 6
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS, JUNE 1925–MARCH 1926 
Source: See the text.
 In Figure 7, large cumulative abnormal returns begin at the opening of the 
event window in 1929 and reach about 20 percent. This increase suggests 
that the price of seats may have increased by 15 or perhaps 20 percent (if 
news leaked out early) because of the quarter-seat dividend. We conclude 
that the potentially greater liquidity of the exchange made the seats more 
valuable. The brokers expected the expansion to ease the NYSE’s capacity 
constraint and enhance its competitiveness. This increase in abnormal re-
turns does not appear to be related to the stock market boom because the 
timing of these returns does not match the movements in the boom well. The 
first run up in the market began in March 1928, well in advance of the seat 
dividend. The market again experienced high monthly returns in October 
and November of 1928 when discussions of the seat dividend were at an 
early stage, but the extraordinary returns in summer of 1929 have no effect 
on seat prices, which are roughly flat. In fact, in a subsequent study, it ap-
pears that NYSE brokers became very pessimistic during the summer and 
the model of seat prices forecasts much higher prices than were observed, 
suggesting that brokers may have expected a collapse in the market.61
61 White, “Anticipating the Stock Market Crash.” 
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FIGURE 7
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS, JUNE 1928–FEBRUARY 1929 
Source: See the text. 
SOLUTION OR FALSE HOPE? 
 Were the members of the exchange too sanguine, expecting that they 
could prevent further erosion of the NYSE’s première position by the 
quarter-seat dividend? Whether or not the exchange improved the li-
quidity and the competitiveness of the exchange should be visible in the 
behavior of the post-seat-dividend bid-ask spreads. Separate regressions 
of equation one that combine the high volume days for 1928 and 1929 
and low days for 1928 and 1929 reveal the extent of the changes. A 
dummy variable for the extraordinarily high day of 26 March 1929, 
when volume climbed above 8 million shares, is included to test for any 
higher-level capacity constraint. The interaction terms are now set equal 
to one for the predividend period to provide a means of comparing the 
effects of the seat increase for both high and low volume days. If the 
NYSE had been capacity constrained before the seat dividend but not 
afterwards, we would expect the coefficients on the interaction terms 
for the exchange-wide variables, total volume and the Herfindahl index, 
to be significant in the combined high volume regressions but not in the 
combined low volume regressions.  
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TABLE 6 
ESTIMATES OF THE BID-ASK SPREADS: COMBINED HIGH AND LOW VOLUME 
DAYS, 1928 AND 1929
* indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
+ indicates significance at the 5 percent level. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 Table 6 presents fixed effects regressions for the combined high and 
low volume days. The estimates for the stock-specific variables are 
again stable and similar to previous estimates. On low volume days, 
higher volume of trading or greater concentration appears to have no ef-
fect. On high volume days, all the exchange-wide variables are highly 
High Days
1928–1929
Fixed
Effects
 High Days
1928–1929
Fixed
Effects
 Low Days
1928–1929
Fixed
Effects
 Low Days 
1928–1929
Fixed
Effects
Sales  –0.188* –0.196* –0.141* –0.215* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.017) 
Closing price  –0.444* –0.438* –0.576* –0.518* 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.046) (0.057) 
Yearly volatility  0.274* 0.281* 0.179* 0.219* 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.034) (0.048) 
Daily volatility   0.000  0.238* 
  (0.000)  (0.030) 
Call loan rate  0.887* 0.878* –0.234 –0.408+ 
 (0.162) (0.160) (0.144) (0.077) 
Total exchange volume  0.143 0.134 0.132+ 0.149 
 0.145 (0.144) (0.061) (0.077) 
Herfindahl index  1.691* 1.668* 0.019 –0.154 
 (0.185) (0.183) (0.035) (0.101) 
Dummy march 26, 1929  –0.681* –0.658*   
 (0.143) (0.142)   
Predividend * sales  0.060* 0.018 0.032+ 0.014 
 (0.009) (0.098) (0.014) (0.023) 
Predividend * close  –0.119* –0.084 –0.033 –0.036 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.039) 
Predividend * yearly volatility  –0.001 –0.004* –0.091* –0.187* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.034) (0.056) 
Predividend * daily volatility   0.0528*  –0.001+ 
  (0.004)  –0.000 
Predividend * call rate  –1.412* –1.227* 0.750+ 0.949+ 
 (0.176) (0.175) (0.335) (0.424) 
Predividend * Herfindahl  –2.078* –1.991* -0.126 0.026 
 (0.187) (0.185) (0.096) (0.117) 
Predividend * total volume  0.846* 0.803* 0.030 0.050 
 (0.187) (0.077) (0.072) (0.092) 
Constant –8.572* –8.248* 0.815 1.102
 (2.377) (2.351) (1.459) (1.897) 
Adjusted R2  0.540 0.571 0.443 0.503 
Number of Observations  7,559 7,555 5,480 3,366 
Number of Stocks  985 985 1,068 801 
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TABLE 7
PREDICTED PERCENTAGE BID-ASK SPREAD 
 1928 High
Volume
 1929 High 
Volume
Mean total volume  0.777  0.759 
1 percent increase in total volume  0.804  0.761 
Total volume at 4 million  0.377  0.695 
Total volume at 5 million  0.801  0.734 
Total volume at 6 million  1.483  0.768 
Total volume at 8 million  3.920  1.309 
Source: See the text. 
correlated, as is the dummy for 26 March 1929, making it difficult to 
estimate the coefficients precisely. The flood of orders on the 8 million 
share day drove bid-ask spreads down further. The only unexpected re-
sult is that the Herfindahl index has a positive and significant sign. 
More importantly, the interaction terms for the exchange-wide variables 
confirm the presence of capacity effects on high volume days before the 
increase in the number of seats. Before the seat dividend, higher total 
volume on the exchange significantly increased individual stocks’ bid-
ask spreads, mitigated by more concentrated trading as indicated by the 
coefficient on the Herfindahl index. These effects are absent in the 
combined low volume regressions, as conjectured. Thus, the increase in 
the number of seats appears to have dampened the effects of volume 
surges on bid-ask spreads. 
 Table 7 presents the predicted spreads for high volume days in 1928 
and 1929 using the mean values of the variables. In contrast to the re-
sults for 1928, the response of bid-ask spreads to high volume days was 
drastically reduced in 1929. A 1 percent increase in total volume had an 
imperceptible effect, and the increases from five to six million remain 
modest, under one tick. Although the coefficient on the high volume 
day, 26 March 1929, is negative, these estimates suggest that there may 
have been a new higher capacity constraint even with 1,375 seats. At 
eight million shares, the bid-ask spread would have jumped to 1.309 
percent, but it still would have been far below a predicted 3.92 percent 
when there were 1,100 seats. Thus, there was still a substantial weaken-
ing of the effects of volume surges on bid-ask spreads after the quarter-
seat dividend. The expansion of the exchange had enhanced its liquidity 
and competitiveness. 
 The expansion of the exchange created more competition on the floor 
of the exchange for existing brokers. Did they lose out or did business 
on the exchange rise enough to compensate them for potentially lower 
bid-ask spreads? Unfortunately, there are no records of brokerage 
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houses available to test this possibility. However, a naïve calculation 
suggests that the increased volume following the expansion outweighed 
the decline in bid-ask spreads. At the mean volume prior to the expan-
sion, the mean percentage bid-ask spread was 0.777 percent; afterwards 
it was 0.759 percent. Trading was consistently higher month-by-month 
in 1929 compared to 1928. In July 1928 the market value of shares 
traded on the NYSE was $52,903 million and in July 1929 it was 
$77,264 million.62 These figures would imply that profits would have 
been $411 million for 1928 and $586 million for 1929, an increase of 
more than 25 percent. The exchange’s gambit thus appears to have been 
quite successful.  
CONCLUSION 
 After World War I the flow of orders to American stock exchanges 
was rapidly increasing, and the NYSE reached a capacity constraint that 
was determined by the fixed number of seats. Given the state of tech-
nology and the rules of the exchange, higher order flows produced de-
lays and reduced the quality of service to customers. Concern over the 
potential loss of business to competing exchanges forced the NYSE to 
consider its options. Although some members were unhappy, the over-
whelming majority found that the creation of a quarter-seat dividend 
provided them with a means to personally capture the gains from in-
creasing the efficiency of the exchange. The rise in the number of seats 
eased the pressure on the bid-ask spread from surges in volume. As an-
ticipated, the increase in seats greased the order processing machine on 
the floor of the exchange and delivered benefits to customers, even as 
competition from other exchanges continued to grow. The 275 new 
seats moved, but apparently did not eliminate, the constraint, as critics 
who pushed for an even greater increase had warned. However, this 
boundary would not be tested until long after the Great Depression. 
Volume had exceeded 5 million shares on 24 days in 1928 and 36 days 
in 1929. Afterwards, it was a rare occurrence: one day each in 1937, 
1939, 1946, 1959; two days in 1957, 1958, and 1960; and three days in 
1955. Only when the go-go years began in 1961 and the exchange ex-
perienced 5 million plus shares on 41 days would the capacity of the 
exchange be tested again. 
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